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Abstract 
This article discusses two major conceptions of competition, the classical and the 
neoclassical. In the classical conception, competition is viewed as a dynamic rivalrous 
process of firms struggling with each other over the expansion of their market shares 
at the expense of their competitors. This dynamic view of competition characterizes 
mainly the works of Smith, Ricardo, J.S. Mill and Marx; a similar view can be also 
found in the writings of Austrian economists and the business literature. By contrast, 
the neoclassical conception of competition is derived from the requirements of a 
theory geared towards static equilibrium and not from any historical observation of 
the way in which firms actually organize and compete with each other.  
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1. Introduction 
This article contrasts the classical and the neoclassical theories of competition, 
starting with the classical one as this was developed in the writings of Smith, Ricardo, 
J.S. Mill and more explicitly analyzed in Marx’s Capital. The claim that this paper 
raises is that the classical conception of competition despite its realism was gradually 
replaced by the neoclassical one, according to which competition is an end state rather 
than a description of the way in which firms organize and actually compete with each 
other. In fact, most of the phenomena commonly associated with real life competition, 
such as for example aggressive price cutting, concentration of capital, uncertainty, and 
the like, in the neoclassical approach are theorized as deviations from what 
competition ought to be, that is, perfect competition. Perfect competition, is always in 
the background, when neoclassical theory addresses issues of industrial organization 
or government regulation of industry and the various market forms, such as 
monopoly, oligopoly and the like are literally derived from the perfectly competitive 
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model. By contrast, classical theory views these “deviations” as precisely the 
expected results of the actual operation of competition, as a process of rivalry where 
firms fight with each other in their incessant struggle for survival. 
The remainder of the article is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the 
classical approach to competition as articulated by Smith, Ricardo and J.S. Mill. 
Section 3 focuses on the development of the neoclassical conception of competition 
and discusses the phenomena that within this theory would constitute prima facie 
evidence of the lack of competition as a description of a situation rather than as a 
rivalrous process. Section 4 shows that the same phenomena that would indicate the 
presence of monopoly or power of firms over market forces, in Marx’s analysis —
which is within the classical approach— are precisely the results that one would 
expect from the operation of capitalist competition and the tendential equalization of 
the profit rates across industries. Finally, Section 5 provides a summary and some 
concluding remarks. 
 
2. Classical Conception of Competition 
Classical economists viewed competition as the mechanism that coordinates the 
conflicting self-interests of independently acting individuals and directs them to the 
attainment of equilibrium in a dynamic sense of the term, that is, a never-ending 
process of elimination of any excess profits or losses and the tendential establishment 
of natural prices as the centres of gravitation of market prices. This is the reason why 
Smith notes that despite the fact that each individual is pursuing the satisfaction of his 
own self-interest, nevertheless “is led by an invisible hand to promote an end which 
was no part of his intention” (Smith, Wealth, p. 456). J.S. Mill is more explicit about 
the role of competition as the coordinating mechanism, which enables the study of 
economic phenomena in a rigorous and therefore scientific way. He notes: 
 
Only, through the principle of competition has political economy any 
pretension to the character of science. So far as rents, profits, wages, 
prices, are determined by competition, laws may be assigned for them. 
Assume competition to be the exclusive regulator, and principles of 
broad generality and scientific precision may be laid down, according to 
which they will be regulated. (J.S. Mill, 1848, p.147)  
 
Although from the above quotation, one cannot derive exactly how J.S. Mill 
defines competition, nevertheless he argues that through competition both natural 
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prices and incomes can be determined in a rigorous way and what is more important 
“independently of people’s will”; that is, J.S. Mill explicitly recognizes that in the 
economy there are in operation objective mechanisms (or “laws”) that can be the 
subject of abstract theorization. Classical economists described competition as an 
endless rivalrous equilibrating process and not as an end-state or a state of affairs as is 
portrayed in neoclassical economics. For instance, Smith describes this rivalrous 
price-cutting process through which capitals (firms) are in constant pressure to 
innovate. Smith notes,   
 
Competition of producers who, in order to undersell one another, have 
recourse to new divisions of labour, and new improvements of art, which 
might never otherwise have been thought of. (Smith, Wealth, p.706) 
 
Furthermore, in this competitive process actual prices are attracted to their natural 
ones, and by doing so the rate of profit together with wages and rents (in the case of 
agricultural products) gravitate towards their normal analogues. The condition sine 
qua non for the attainment of these normal positions of the economy is the free 
mobility of capitals, or what Adam Smith calls “perfect liberty”. Notes Smith,  
 
Every man, as long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is left 
perfectly free to pursue his own interests in his own way, and to bring both 
his industry and his capital into competition with those of any other man. 
(Smith, Wealth, p. 687)   
 
Again Smith refers this time implicitly to the “invisible hand”, when he points out 
that competition essentially directs the actions of each individual pursuing his own 
self-interest to promote society’s welfare, even though this is not part of his 
intentions, 
 
Every individual is continually exerting himself to find out the most 
advantageous employment for whatever capital he can command. It is his 
own advantage, indeed, and not that of the society which he has in view. 
But the study of his own advantage naturally, or rather necessarily, leads 
him to prefer that employment which is most advantageous to the society. 
(Smith, Wealth, p. 338) 
 
However, classical economists in general were not particularly clear as to the 
requirements of competitive behaviour and how it was affected by the number of 
participants. Thus although competition was conceived as a rivalrous process 
nevertheless often there are statements that could be interpreted as supporting a 
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quantitative, and therefore neoclassical perspective of competition. A characteristic 
example is the following quotation from Smith  
 
The quantity of grocery goods, for example, which can be sold in a 
particular town, is limited by the demand of that town and its 
neighbourhood. The capital, therefore, which can be employed in the 
grocery trade, cannot exceed what is sufficient to purchase that quantity. If 
this capital is divided between two different grocers, their competition will 
tend to make both of them sell cheaper than if it were in the hands of one 
only; and if it were divided among twenty, their competition would be just 
so much the greater, and the chance of their combining together, in order 
to raise the price, just so much the less. Their competition might, perhaps, 
ruin some of themselves; but to take care of this, is the business of the 
parties concerned, and it may safely be trusted to their discretion. It can 
never hurt either the consumer or the producer; on the contrary, it must 
tend to make the retailers both sell cheaper and buy dearer, than if the 
whole trade was monopolized by one or two persons. (Smith, Wealth, p. 
272 ) 
 
Hence, one could discern some of the seeds of a quantitative notion of 
competition. Stigler (1957 and 1987), in particular, read in the above lines the 
description of the basic requirement of perfect competition, which is that competition 
is directly related to the number of participants. A closer examination of the above 
quotation reveals that even in this case competition is fought through the lowering of 
prices regardless of the structure of the industry, that is, the number of combatants 
(McNulty, 1967 and Moudud, 2010). Nevertheless, neoclassical authors interpret 
statements such as the above to mean that in Smith there was an early development of 
perfect competition, which Smith could not define with the necessary precision, 
because economic theory was still in its makings and its full development ought to 
wait until (or even long after) the marginal revolution, as we will see in the next 
session. But, if only one thinks of Smith’s “trifling example” of the pin factory, where 
there is an ever-present pressure to undercut unit costs by increasing productivity 
through the division of labour, then by attributing to Smith a neoclassical notion of 
(perfect) competition is a (neoclassical) perspective-imposed concept. Thus, the 
above-cited quotation is more in the context of a mercantile economy dominated by 
trade guilds monopolizing both production (producers) and consumption (shop-
keepers) rather than to capitalist enterprises proper operating in towns or cities in 
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accordance to the mobility of capital and labour.1 The trouble with Smith, Ricardo 
and J.S. Mill was that they did not distinguish in any sufficiently clear and, therefore, 
theoretically adequate way between inter-industry and intra-industry competition; 
thereby, subsuming the difference of these two distinctive types of competitive 
behaviour and phenomena into various time spans. 
Thus “the law of one price” accepted by both classical and neoclassical 
economists2 is supposed to operate in a short time span and since we are referring to 
the same commodity, it follows that we are necessarily referring to intra-industry 
competition. By contrast, the attainment of natural prices requires longer time spans, 
as capital flows in and out of industries tendentially equalizing profit rates and thus 
this type of competition is between industries. In a nutshell, Smith, Ricardo and J.S. 
Mill had conceived competition as a process, whose short-run expression was the 
establishment of an equal price (“law of one price”) and unequal profit rates between 
firms within industries and different prices between industries which nevertheless 
tend to be equalized, in the long-run, with their natural prices, because of the inflow 
and outflow of capital (“law of equal profitability”). This becomes particularly 
pronounced in Ricardo, when he explains the adjustment mechanism of establishing 
equilibrium (natural) prices between industries: 
 
There is perhaps no manufacturer, however rich, who limits his business 
to the extent that his own funds alone will allow […]. When the demand 
for silks increases, and that for cloth diminishes, the clothier does not 
remove with his capital to the silk trade, but he dismisses some of his 
workmen, he discontinues his demand for the loan from bankers and 
monied men; while the case of the silk manufacturer is the reverse: he 
wishes to employ more workmen, and thus his motive for borrowing is 
increased: he borrows more, and thus capital is transferred from one 
employment to another, without the necessity of a manufacturer 
discontinuing his usual occupation. When we look to the markets of a 
large town, and observe how regularly they are supplied both with home 
and foreign commodities, in the quantity in which they are required, 
under all circumstances of varying demand […] without often producing 
                                                 
1 In similar fashion one can interpret the following quotation “competition rages in direct proportion to 
the number, and in inverse proportion to the magnitudes, of the antagonistic capitals” (Marx, 1867, p. 
626), which really refers in the context of a precapitalist society. 
2 For example, Jevon’s “law of indifference” (cf., Schumpeter, 1954, p.973) and Walras’s idea “that 
each service and each product have only one price in the market” (Walras, 1874, p. 255). In similar 
fashion, Marshall (1890, p.325) notes that “the more nearly perfect a market is, the stronger the 
tendency for the same price to be paid for the same thing at the same time in all parts of the market”. 
Hence, Marshall clearly views the “law of one price” as a tendency of prices to crowd near an average 
price following a distribution akin to normal. In this sense, Marshall remains within the spirit of the 
classical economists. 
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either the effect of a glut from too abundant a supply, or an enormously 
high price from the supply being unequal to the demand, we must 
confess that the principle which apportions capital to each trade in the 
precise amount that is required, is more active than is generally 
supposed. (Ricardo, Principles, p. 90) 
 
In Ricardo the presence of excess profits or losses simply accelerates or 
decelerates the process of capital accumulation, furthermore the credit system 
facilitates and enhances the operation of this mechanism and there is no need for entry 
or exit of firms from other industries. These aspects of competition, however, are 
confused in Smith’s analysis and are not adequately clarified neither in Ricardo nor in 
J.S. Mill and as we will argue, after our discussion of the neoclassical competition, are 
explained in sufficient detail in Marx’s Capital. 
 
3. Neoclassical Competition 
The analysis of competition in the neoclassical theory is contained in the model of 
perfect competition, which describes the ideal conditions that must hold in the market 
so as to ensure the existence of perfectly competitive behaviour from the typical firm 
and, by extension, the characterisation of the industry as competitive or not. The 
model of perfect competition describes a market form consisting of a large number of 
small —relative to the size of the market— firms selling a homogeneous commodity 
to a large number of consumers. All market participants have perfect information 
about the prices and the costs of each good, consumer preferences are given and 
finally, there are no impediments whatsoever in the mobility of the factors of 
production. The result of the above conditions is that the producers and consumers —
because of their large number and small size— are incapable of influencing the price 
of the product, which becomes a datum for each and every individual firm or 
consumer in the market. The behaviour of the firms becomes completely passive with 
respect to the price of the product (“price taking behaviour”) and as for the 
production, the firm simply chooses the level of output consistent with the 
maximization of profits which is achieved at the point where the price equals with the 
marginal cost of the product. The same price also maximizes consumers utility and by 
extension society’s welfare. The conception of perfect competition is therefore 
required for the neoclassical theory to render static equilibrium determinate. 
The intensity of competition is directly proportional to the number of producers 
and, in general, the structure of an industry. In this “quantitative notion of 
 7 
 
competition”, the firm is conceived as the legal entity which by hiring and organizing 
the services of the factors of production supplies goods and services in the market. It 
is important to note that the firm does not own any of the factors of production; it 
merely hires the services of the factors of production offered by their owners, that is, 
the individuals. The larger the number of firms operating in an industry the more 
vigorous is their competitive behaviour and, so is the establishment of a uniform rate 
of profit across firms and industries. By contrast, the smaller the number of firms in 
an industry, the more monopolistic or oligopolistic is the form of competition and 
therefore the higher the inter-industry profit rate differentials. In this non-competitive 
state of equilibrium, some prices are above the marginal cost, so society as a whole 
suffers welfare losses from the underproduction and the underutilisation of disposable 
productive resources. In the neoclassical microeconomic theory, if the firm or the 
industry displays profits above normal, for a fairly long period of time, they are 
attributed to imperfections in the operation of the market and thus in the existence of 
some degree of monopoly. 
The concept of perfect competition appears, perhaps for the first time and in 
embryonic form in Cournot (1838), whose analysis was premised on the maximising 
behaviour of the participating firms at the point of equality of marginal revenue and 
marginal cost. Cournot also related the number of firms to the market price, the larger 
the number of firms the lower their selling price and in the case of “unlimited 
competition”; that is, when the number of firms becomes infinitely large the selling 
prices become equal to their respective marginal costs. These concepts were also 
present in the writings of the other French engineers of the early nineteenth century, 
who although did not know anything about perfect competition, nevertheless they new 
pretty well the efficiency gains or losses of the marginal cost pricing and the 
difficulties in its applications. The often cited didactic example of such 
inconsistencies has been advanced by Dupuit ([1844], 1969) and is related to the 
imposition of the correct price of crossing the bridge. We know that the marginal cost 
of crossing the bridge, other things equal, is zero and so must be the optimal price 
(toll) of crossing the bridge. But for a price equal to zero, there is no private incentive 
to build bridges and a positive price (toll) on the other hand leads to resource 
misallocation and society’s net welfare loss. Cournot’s and the French engineers’ 
ideas, however, could not attract much attention in the early nineteenth century 
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because of the absolute dominance of classical economics and their view of 
competition as a process of rivalry and not as a static situation.  
The neoclassical description of competition as a state rather than as a process of 
rivalry is far from the harsh reality of the results of competitive behaviour as is well 
known from the economic history of the last quarter of the nineteenth century. More 
specifically, the depression of 1873-1896 intensified price cutting behaviour and led 
to the elimination of a large number of weaker firms, massive unemployment and the 
concentration and centralization of capital. It has been observed that in dismal 
situations such as those of depressions, people, often, distant themselves from the 
harsh reality of the present and start fantasizing idealised situations. Clearly, an 
idealized situation is where firms are pictured as being independent of each other and 
each and every one of them is impotent with respect to the prevailing price. Hence, 
the law of one price coupled with the incapacity of firms to set prices combined with 
the lack of any mechanism under which firms become more efficient —such as for 
example, through innovations— lead to the deprivation of firm heterogeneity. 
Consequently, as all firms in the industry share the same technology producing a 
homogenous product and each and every one of them possesses the same tiny market 
share and, therefore, there is no motive what so ever for firms to enter or exit the 
industry because all of them are earning the same rate of profit. Furthermore, the 
notion of perfect competition fits perfectly with the core data of the neoclassical 
theory for its suitability with the way in which technology is integrated in the theory. 
More specifically, perfect competition secures that firms, from the blueprint of 
available technologies, choose the lowest cost technology. In this sense, the business 
enterprise of the real world is not suitable to the neoclassical competition simply 
because firms in reality are in an inescapable pressure to innovate and, therefore, to 
introduce cost minimizing techniques in their never-ending struggle to eliminate 
competitors by cutting unit cost and prices.  
Similar conclusions are drawn from Walras’s conception of attainment of 
equilibrium through the mediation of the auctioneer tale. We know that the 
participants in this model are assumed to act independently of each other and simply 
react to the prices announced by the auctioneer, who is supposed to know the 
preferences of all the participants in the market and records their responses to the set 
of announced prices. The auctioneer accounts for these responses in the new set of 
prices until all differences are eliminated and trade starts taking place exclusively at 
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equilibrium prices. Clearly, if the participants in the Walrasian model act differently, 
then the attainment of equilibrium would not be possible. As a consequence, perfect 
competition is a sine qua non prerequisite in the Walrasian model for the 
determination of equilibrium prices. In short, the concept of perfect competition is 
required for the proper operation of the Walrasian auctioneer, because no single 
participant knows anything more than anybody else and each and every one of them is 
acting independently of the others. These conditions are satisfied, when there is an 
infinitely large number of infinitesimally small, with respect to the size of the market, 
participants. From the above it becomes clear that the givens of the neoclassical 
theory, that is, the preferences of individuals, their endowments and technological 
alternatives, when combined, impose a type of competition which cannot be different 
from perfect competition. Examples that delineate the necessity of perfect competition 
may include Jevon’s consumer’s equilibrium position requiring the passivity of 
consumers who simply react to prices and the same is true in welfare economics and 
the attainment of Pareto optimality. Wicksteed’s product exhaustion theorem of 
income distribution is another example which is invalidated only in a perfectly 
competitive environment.  
One question is that if each agent is a “taker” of the market equilibrium price and 
perceives herself as incapable of affecting it, how does price ever reach equilibrium? 
Here is where the Walrasian auctioneer enters the picture as the deus ex machina and 
fixes the equilibrium prices experimenting with various vectors of possible 
equilibrium prices and correcting them the economic agents grope towards the 
equilibrium. Under these circumstance, and as exchange takes place only at 
equilibrium prices the auctioneer really obliterates any possibility of understanding of 
the way in which actual markets equilibrate. One consequence of the above is that the 
classical notion of competition that deals with the attainment of equilibrium as a 
tendency and in real time was eventually side-stepped for it did not fit with the 
analytical framework of neoclassical economics, which is oriented towards 
equilibrium as a state (see also Eatwell, 1981, Clifton, 1977, Blaug, 1999, inter alia).  
The formal requirements of perfect competition were worked out by Edgeworth 
(1881), for instance in his model of exchange, where the attainment of optimality 
requires the passivity of the agents in terms of given relative prices. Naturally, 
Edgeworth promoted the concept albeit with not much success not only for its 
patently unrealistic nature as to verge on the outrageous, but mainly because of the 
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dominance of the ideas of classical economists. Marshall sought to circumvent the 
problems of acceptance of the new theory by assimilating the classical tradition with 
neoclassical economics. The classical dynamical process of competition gradually 
was to be translated into static terms, that is, the number of producers and the type of 
product may characterize the form of competition. However, even in Marshall’s time, 
perfect competition was not fully formulated into an operational model and this job 
was accomplished, to a great extent, in Knight’s (1921) book, which was essentially 
his dissertation written under Allyn Young’s diligent supervision.3 Knight in his book 
described in a comprehensive and meticulous way the requirements of perfect 
competition that could be used in the real economy. The trouble with such a 
description, however, was that it could not be easily applied to real economies and 
this according to Stigler (1957) paved the way for the development and wide 
acceptance of the notion of monopolistic competition in the 1930s.  
The notion of perfect competition and the associated with it Marshallian theory of 
the firm has been criticized by Sraffa (1925, 1926) who showed that in a partial 
equilibrium framework one cannot define the usual U-shaped average and marginal 
cost curves which give rise to an upward slopping supply curve. As a consequence, 
constant returns to scale appear as the only logical assumption for the neoclassical 
partial equilibrium analysis of a perfectly competitive firm and under constant returns 
the given price cannot but coincide with the marginal cost curve rendering thus the 
size of the firm and its supply decisions indeterminate. Under these circumstances, 
Sraffa suggested that either one should opt for a general equilibrium approach, which 
at that time was an exceedingly difficult task to accomplish, or maintain the 
Marshallian partial equilibrium analysis but discarding the perfectly competitive firm 
and replacing it by the firm practicing product differentiation operating in 
monopolistically competitive markets. The monopolistic competition suggestion was 
picked up a few years later independently by J. Robinson (1933) in the UK and by 
Chamberlin (1933) in the USA and essentially they were those that launched what 
came to be called as the “monopolistic competition revolution” in the 1930s. Both 
authors suggested that perfect competition should be abandoned in favour of 
monopolistic competition (see Tsoulfidis, 2009 and 2010, ch. 9). Robinson was 
                                                 
3 Allyn Young is the supervisor of at least two famous dissertations one by Frank Knight and the other 
by Edwin Chamberlin.  
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explicit about the marginalization of perfect competition and the generality of 
imperfect competition, she noted 
 
it is more proper to set out the analysis of monopoly treating perfect 
competition as a special case. (Robinson, 1933, p. 250-251) 
 
Although Robinson openly admitted her influence from Sraffa’s articles, 
nevertheless her analysis was based more on the tools of the Marshallian tradition and 
soon after the publication of her book she essentially abandoned the further 
development of “imperfect competition” and the associated with it revolution. In fact, 
she wrote very little about imperfect competition (after the publication of her book) as 
she lost faith in the concept and her interests diverted to other areas of economics 
such as the critique of the neoclassical theory of capital and economic growth. 
Chamberlin, on the other hand, although not willing at all to admit any external 
influences to his work and especially from Sraffa’s articles and the theoretical 
developments in Cambridge England. In spite of all these, Chamberlin produced a 
body of work which was much more faithful to Sraffa’s suggestion and he managed to 
develop new analytical tools promoting the concept  of “monopolistic competition” 
until the very end of his life. 
The upshot of the monopolistic competition revolution was that (perfect) 
competition became a special case and imperfect (or monopolistic) competition 
became the norm. This sparked a debate among neoclassicals; on the one hand, 
economists mainly associated with Harvard University (Chamberlin, Mason, 
Galbraith, inter alia) argued that actual economic life is in deviation from that 
described in perfect competition and thus government’s role is to correct these 
imperfections using as a benchmark the perfectly competitive model. On the other 
hand, economists mainly associated with Chicago University, mainly the trio Stigler, 
Friedman and Harberger argued that capitalism works and gives rise to results that are 
approximately those predicted by the model of perfect competition and that 
monopolistic competition is a much more complex approach (not even a single 
model) and its complexity is not justified by its predictive content. Thence came 
Friedman's (1953) famous methodological principle which stated that “a model is 
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judged according to its predictive content and not the realism of its assumptions”.4 In 
this context, he used the example of the price effects of an indirect tax imposed on 
cigarettes which could be predicted with sufficient accuracy using a partial 
equilibrium framework and the model of perfect competition, although the cigarettes 
industry possesses the characteristics of monopolistic or oligopolistic competition. 
This debate in the 1930s and 1940s gave rise to the disciplines of industrial 
organization and government regulation of industry. By the end of the 1940s or early 
1950s the “monopolistic competition revolution” was replaced by perfect competition 
as the norm until, at least, the second monopolistic competition revolution in the 
1980s with the advent of new Keynesian and also new consensus macroeconomics.  
In this comeback of monopolistic competition particular attention has been paid 
in developing more general and realistic models of competitive behaviour and in these 
efforts game theory became particularly popular, however, till now there is a whole 
host of game models but none is generally accepted which characterizes the behaviour 
of a competitive industry. These imperfect competition models were further 
elaborated so as to become part of new theories of international trade and economic 
growth. On further examination, however, one discovers that underneath all these 
imperfect competition models was the fundamental faith in perfect competition. This 
recourse to game theories is an admission that the usual textbook analysis of 
competition is far for being satisfactory.   
It is important to point out that the dominance of the neoclassical theory in the 
field of microeconomics is due, at least partly, to heterodox economists. For reasons 
that have to be explained, many heterodox (radical) economists thought that the 
model of perfect competition was realistic for analyzing the capitalism of the 
nineteenth and perhaps early twentieth century, when the (absolute) size of firms was 
supposed to be small, and, therefore, firms were following market signals simply 
because they were impotent to change the market outcomes. Many heterodox 
economists (Kalecki, Sweezy, Foster, inter alia) have repeatedly asserted that the last 
decade of the nineteenth or the beginning of the twentieth century, have marked a new 
era of capitalism, where a small number of gigantic firms (megacorps) possess power 
                                                 
4 Stigler (1937) was the first to reject the imperfect competition approach on methodological grounds, 
although such a rejection is more associated with Friedman (1953) who by popularising this 
methodological principle so much ended up to associate it with his name.  
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over the market forces so that they can fix their prices and thus manage to secure a 
higher than average (competitive) rate of profit.  
The problem with this view claiming that firms possess market power is that it 
does not provide the required evidence. There is no doubt that with the passage of 
time the absolute average capital requirements of firms have increased, but by no 
means has this implied that the power of firms over market forces has also increased, 
because, at the same time, the size of the market has increased immensely. Thus, only 
a relative with the size of the market comparison of firms might be meaningful and 
such a comparison is exceedingly difficult for the lack of data. Besides, larger relative 
size does not necessarily imply higher profitability and this is certainly an empirical 
question that gave rise to a voluminous literature in the USA and elsewhere. The 
evidence, to the extent that we know the literature, does not lend support to the view 
of “market power”, especially when the time span of the analysis is sufficiently long.  
Schumpeter’s (1942) keen analysis was also dismissive of the idea of the 
existence of a perfectly competitive stage of capitalism, he notes: 
 
[A]n entirely imaginary golden age of perfect competition that at some 
time somehow metamorphosed itself into the monopolistic age, whereas it 
is quite clear that perfect competition has at no time been more of reality 
than it is at present. (Schumpeter, 1942, p. 81) 
 
Furthermore, Schumpeter (1942, p. 106) characterized such a competitive stage of 
capitalism as “wishful thinking”.5  
While Schumpeter and also Austrian economists (e.g, Kirzner, 1987) are critical 
of the static conception of competition (either in its perfect or in its monopoly form) 
and have many interesting insights on the nature of competition as a rivalrous process 
of discovery in which entrepreneurs seek new profit opportunities in a world of 
constant change. As a consequence, excess profits are by no means a sign of lack of 
adequate competition and index of inefficiency, but rather an indication that 
entrepreneurs are responding to shifting market conditions. In spite of the realism of 
their premises, Austrian and also evolutionary economists have failed, so far at least, 
                                                 
5 It is important to stress that Schumpeter is not always consistent with his views on competition as he 
was influenced by the presence of Chamberlin and other economists at Harvard University that were 
among the protagonists of the monopolistic competition revolution. Thus, one cannot pinpoint with 
certainty what exactly Schumpeter thinks, it seems though that he did not completely break with the 
neoclassical view. For example, he notes: [P]erfect competition is not only impossible but inferior’ 
(ibid., p. 106), see also Michaelides and Milios (2005).  
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to present their views in an accepted and, at the same time, workable and testable 
model of competition. In what follows, we focus on Marx’s work and the post-
Marxian discussion, where again competition is viewed along the classical approach 
and to our view sheds light and helps to the understanding of many of the 
contemporaneous phenomena. 
 
4. Marx on Competition 
In what follows we present Marx’s analysis of competition as an extension and further 
elaboration of the classical conception of competition expounded mainly by Smith 
Ricardo and J.S. Mill and in general what came to be known as the classical approach 
to economics. The salient feature in Marx’s analysis is that competition is a derived 
concept and not the starting point of the analysis, which is the expansion of profits as 
an end in itself (Shaikh, 1980; Semmler, 1984) and therefore the analysis of 
competition among capitals follows the laws of accumulation of capital.6 As the units 
of capital strive to expand their market share, increase production and profits, they 
must take actions to confront the efforts of other units of capital engaged in similar 
efforts. This is the reason why Marx argues that the analysis of the laws of 
accumulation, what he calls the “inner nature of capital” (Capital, vol. I, p. 316) 
precede the analysis of competition. And furthermore, competition of capitals is the 
mechanism by which the laws of capital accumulation become “felt by each individual 
capitalist, as external coercive laws” (Capital, vol. I, p. 592). 
For Marx, competition is envisioned as a turbulent and inherently violent process 
that resembles, in many respects, actual “war” (Marx, 1847). The market share of 
firms, for example, is like the territory of countries engaged in war, while technical 
change is like the arms race, since it is through technical change that firms can lower 
their unit cost and prices, attack their competitors and gain a larger share in the market 
for themselves (Shaikh, 1980). The war-like aspect of competition in Marx is 
discussed in his writings already prior to Capital (e.g., Marx, 1847) and also can be 
found in the writings of Engels, who generalized the rivalrous competition to many 
aspects of economic life. For instance he notes: 
 
                                                 
6 For example, Ricardo begins his analysis of value assuming an equalization of profit rates, whereas 
for Marx this requires the writing of two volumes of Capital first and eight chapters from volume III. 
 15 
 
Competition is the completest expression of the battle of all against all 
which rules in modern civil society. This battle, a battle for life, for 
existence, for everything, in case of need a battle of life and death, is 
fought not between the different classes of society only, but also 
between the individual members of these classes. Each is in the way of 
the other, and each seeks to crowd out all who are in his way, and to put 
himself in their place. The workers are in constant competition among 
themselves as are the members of the bourgeoisie among themselves. 
The power-loom weaver is in competition with the hand-loom weaver, 
the unemployed or ill-paid hand-loom weaver with him who has work or 
is better paid, each trying to supplant the other. (Engels, Condition of the 
Working Class in England, 1845, emphasis added) 
 
In Marx’s work, there is a clear distinction of competition between and within 
industries. For example, he notes: 
 
What competition, first in a single sphere, achieves is a single market-
value and market price derived from the various individual values of 
commodities. And it is competition of capitals in different spheres, 
which first brings about the price of production equalising the rates of 
profit in the different spheres. The latter process requires a higher 
development of capitalist production than the previous one. (Capital, 
vol. III, p. 180) 
 
In short, competition leads (tendentially) to the establishment of a common rate of 
profit with different equilibrium prices across industries and a uniform price with 
differential profit rates between firms in the same industry. In what follows, we 
present the salient features of these two aspects of competition and their synthesis 
through the concept of regulating capital. 
 
Competition within industries 
Starting with the aspect of competition between firms within an industry (Marx, 1894, 
pp. 138-39, 178-86, 197-98 and 641-45), firms are viewed as large units of capital, 
which fight with each other over market shares. Capitals in this war-like competition 
are successful only by reducing unit costs through innovations usually associated with 
the introduction of fixed capital. We say fixed capital because through this is achieved  
the effective division of labour, the increase in productivity, the reduction in unit cost 
of production which makes possible the undercutting of price and the elimination of 
competitors:  
 
The battle of competition is fought by cheapening of commodities. The 
cheapness of commodities depends, ceteris paribus, on the productiveness 
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of labour and this again on the scale of production. Therefore, the larger 
capitals beat the smaller. (Capital, vol. I, p. 626) 
 
Although Marx was writing in the nineteenth-century his analysis begins with 
large units of capital, which are already in the battle to reduce unit production costs 
through increasing mechanization. Innovations leading to techniques with lower cost 
make possible the reduction of the selling price, thereby increasing the market share 
of innovators. Imitators cannot follow immediately for they are stuck with their fixed 
capital, which must be kept in operation for a certain period of time in order for their 
owners to realize its value. The innovators as they increase their capital per unit of 
output produced will temporarily reduce their profit rates. However, as they reduce 
the selling price of their commodity and expand their market share, their profit margin 
on sales increases and gradually their rate of profit becomes the highest in the 
industry. Eventually, all producers sell the same commodity for approximately the 
same price, that is, “the law of one price” prevails:  
 
Competition can only make the producers within the same sphere of 
production sell their commodities at the same price. (Capital, vol. III, p. 
865) 
 
It is important to emphasize that the equalization of price within an industry is 
only tendential, that is, all firms in an industry are likely to sell at approximately the 
same price, it follows that firms with lower costs will end up earning profit rates 
higher than those firms with higher costs. The differential profit rates within 
industries are expected to persist because some of the elements of production, such as, 
location, climate, natural resources, management and the like, are not easily 
reproducible and also because of unequal firm innovation and expectations. As a 
consequence, although both classical and neoclassical conceptions of competition 
have in common the law of one price, nevertheless the role of this law is entirely 
different in the two approaches. In neoclassical economics the law of one price is 
being used to establish firms’ homogeneity, whereas in Marx and more generally in 
the classical approach the same law is being used to establish firm heterogeneity. 
 
Competition between Industries 
The first consequence of the analysis of competition between industries is the 
tendential equalization of the inter-industry rates of profit. Firms in each industry are 
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assumed to sell their commodities at market prices that tend to incorporate the 
economy's average rate of profit through the acceleration (deceleration) of capital 
accumulation in industries with profit rates higher (lower) than the economy-wide 
average profit rate.  
The process of equalization of profit rates implies that each industry’s average 
profit rate should repeatedly cross over with the economy’s average rate of profit. In 
econometric terms, the time series data of the deviation of an industry’s profit rate 
from the economy’s average rate of profit should be stationary. In other words, the 
dispersion of the rates of profit around the average takes place quite regularly and 
never comes down to zero, which is equivalent to saying that the two rates of profit do 
not converge to each other. In other words, the two rates of profit, at any moment in 
time, are unequal to each other and, after long periods, adding up the positive and 
negative differences we end up with a nearly zero outcome.7 Put it in statistical terms 
the variance of the deviations of industries’ profit rates from the economy’s average 
should not display any particular pattern. 
The tendential equalization of interindustry profit rates implies that the level of 
profit margins on sales (or on cost) is directly related to capital-output ratios. This 
result is derived in a straightforward manner from the definition of the profit rate for 
an industry j we can write,  
 
( )
( ) ( )
/
/ /
j j
j
j j j
S Q mSr
K K Q K Q
⎛ ⎞= = =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  or ( )/j j jm r K Q=  
Where r is the rate of profit, S is the total profits, K is the fixed capital stock, Q is the 
gross output or total sales, m is the profit margin on sales and K/Q is the capital-
output ratio. The above formulation shows the direct relationship between profit 
margin on sales of an industry j, mj, and its capital-output ratios (K/Q)j of  the same 
industry. If there is an equalization of profit rates in the economy (rj = r), then it 
follows that the profit margins on sales will tend to be proportional to the relative 
capital-output ratios.8 Thus the high profit margin on sales (or costs) of capital 
intensive industries do not necessarily reflect a kind of monopoly power possessed by 
                                                 
7 For a formal presentation of the long-run equalization of profit rates as a gravitational process see 
Duménil and Lévy (1987) and Flaschel and Semmler (1987). 
8 For an empirical test of this as well as of other core propositions of alternative theories of competition 
with respect to the determinants of the profit margins on sales see Shaikh (1980), Semmler (1984), 
Ochoa and Glick (1992), Tsaliki and Tsoulfidis (1998).  
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firms in these industries over the market forces, but rather they ascertain the operation 
of capitalist competition and the interindustry equalization of profit rates to the 
economy’s average.  
Another consequence of competition is that for industries with a high capital-
output ratio and thus high entry (and also exit) costs, variations in demand will be 
reflected more in variations in capacity utilization and less in price variations through 
the acceleration or deceleration of capital accumulation. In other words, when demand 
changes, industries with a high capital-output ratio tend to absorb demand variations 
through the necessary adjustments in the rate of capital utilization and employment, 
and less through price changes.  
The observed large amounts of reserve capacity in the capital intensive industries 
as well as their sticky prices some heterodox economists have interpreted them as 
indexes of monopoly power, however on closer examination these same phenomena 
are precisely those that one expects to derive from the operation of capitalist 
competition. The firms activated in the heavy capital requirements industries tend to 
maintain relatively large amounts of reserve capacity, but this is quite normal for the 
size of these firms because it costs them less to accommodate variations in demand by 
fluctuations in their reserve capacity and not by changes in prices or output. And only 
in the longer run these large size firms respond to changes in demand by changing 
prices, profit margin on sales and profit rates. Thus if demand increases the heavy 
capital requirements industries will experience high profits, as they reduce their 
reserve capacity and, at the same time, new investment and entry of firms are not easy 
because of high cost requirements. The converse will be true if demand falls, the 
increase in excess capacity and the low profits will persist as disinvestment and exit of 
firms from these industries become costly in the short-run (see also Shaikh, 1980, 
Semmler, 1984 and Botwinik, 1994).  
Once again, the stylized fact of price rigidities in industries with heavy capital 
requirements per unit of output is not necessarily a reflection of monopoly power, but 
rather the expected result of the operation of competition. In similar fashion, the profit 
rates in these heavy capital requirements industries are also expected to display 
smaller variability than those industries characterized by light capital requirements per 
unit of output. The intuitive idea is that if more of the variability in demand is 
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absorbed in output than in price variations, it follows that the rate of profit will be less 
variable in high capital-output ratio industries than in the low ones.9  
 
Regulating capital and its rate of profit 
In the analysis of competition in Marx’s Capital, we are confronted with the 
following ostensibly contradictory situation, where the tendential equalization of 
interindustry profit rates must come to terms with profit rate differentials between 
firms within the same industry. The answer to this seemingly paradoxical result is that 
the equalization of profit rates does not necessarily refer to the mean rate of profit of 
all firms comprising the industry; inasmuch as, an industry consists of firms that use 
the latest technology and ideal location and firms with outdated technology and less 
privileged and therefore higher cost location. Classical economists were aware of 
these limitations in the flows of capital, and, therefore, they considered as the relevant 
rate of profit not necessarily the mean rate of profit but rather the type of capital 
where expansion or contraction of accumulation takes place. In a sense, classical 
economists had a view of marginal capital not in the neoclassical (or strictly 
mathematical) sense of infinitesimally small change, but rather as the type of capital 
on which changes take place. In Ricardo, for example, this kind of marginal capital is 
always associated with the worst (or in Ricardo’s wording) the “most unfavourable” 
conditions of production, whereas in J.S. Mill (1848, p.131) with the best, while in 
Smith the pin factory, “a very trifling manufacturing”, as he notes, is certainly not 
identified with the two extreme situations, but with the one that changes take place 
and, therefore, shape the rhythm of capital accumulation characterizing the industry as 
expanding or contracting. The usual example is the case of agriculture, where the 
most fertile plots of land are already cultivated and are not available for further 
production. If demand increases, with supply given, then the resulting higher price 
encourages the gradual cultivation of less fertile plots of land. In this sense, the type 
of land where expansion of production takes place is the “best available” provided 
that it secures the normal rate of profit, while at the same time the other types of 
cultivated lands give rise to excessive profits (deferential rents). Thus in the case of 
agricultural production the simple average rate of profit would be a poor guide to 
                                                 
9 Practically, this means that the heavy capital requirements industries will display profit rates that will 
remain above (or below) the average for longer periods of time than the light capital requirements 
industries (see also Botwinick, 1994, pp. 143-150). 
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investment flows as it would be much higher than that of parcels of land, where 
investment flows actually take place. Ricardo (1821, p. 73 and pp. 86-87) dwelled in 
the details of this concept of regulating capital which he identified with “the most 
unfavourable” circumstances in agriculture and mining and he generalized it (to our 
view not successfully) to the rest of the economy.  
In the other industries, the regulating conditions of each industry are determined 
by exactly the same method; that is, by the type of capital where expansion or 
contraction of accumulation takes place. The concept is similar to what business 
people and also input-output economists call “the best-practice method of 
production”. This should not lead to the conclusion that all firms adopt this method of 
production immediately, since firms operate fixed capitals of different vintages and 
managers have different expectations about the future direction of demand and 
profitability. Consequently, firms do not easily switch from one method of production 
to another. However, new capitals are expected to enter into the method of 
production, which can be duplicated and, furthermore, the expected rate of profit is 
attractive enough.  
The production method which is targeted by the new entrants is usually the most 
recent in the industry and not the older or the most profitable. The older methods of 
production, ceteris paribus, will have a rate of profit lower than the average, whereas 
the most profitable methods of production may not be easily reproducible or their 
reproduction may be associated with a certain degree of risk, which new entrants may 
not wish to undertake. Hence, over “a cycle of fat and lean years”, that is, a complete 
business cycle, there is a tendency for the rate of profit to equalize among regulating 
capitals across industries. In other words, investment flows are not attracted, for 
example, by the old type of capitals because of low profitability or by the very new 
type of capitals because they are usually associated with too much risk and employ 
new, non-tested and not easily reproducible technologies (because of patents, better 
location, and the like). In general, the regulating conditions of each industry may not 
necessarily coincide with the average conditions but are rather determined by the type 
of capital associated with “the lowest cost methods operating under generally 
reproducible conditions” (Shaikh, 2008, p. 167).  
The rate of profit earned on regulating capital is, therefore, the measure of new 
investment's return and determines the rhythm of capital accumulation. If two 
regulating capitals have different rates of profit, the investment will flow differentially 
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even in the industry with the lowest rate of profit, because of uncertainty and 
differences in expectations among investors. It is important to point out that the 
regulating conditions of production do not necessarily specify a single rate of profit, 
but rather a narrow spectrum of rates of profit. This is true even in the case of a single 
regulating condition of production, because there are still differences in management, 
demand, etc. which may give rise to profit rate dispersions. Consequently, at any 
given moment in time, the rate of profit between regulating capitals across industries 
are not equal and only in the long run is there a tendential equalization of the 
respective rates of profit to an average.  
The problem with the concept of regulating capital is its identification and 
quantification in actual economies. In principle, this appears theoretically, at least, 
possible by observing the evolution of an industry over time and collecting data for a 
group of firms with certain persistent characteristics. Practically, however, such 
observations are extremely difficult to carry out for all industries and for a quite long 
period of time. These difficulties lead to indirect ways of approximating the concept 
of regulating capital and one of these is through the measurement of profit flows 
resulting from recent investment activity. Naturally, investment activity takes place by 
and large for the regulating capitals and so profitability of an industry should be 
estimated not on the capital stock which is really accumulation of all past investment 
flows, but rather on profits that accrue to firms by their new investment.  
This notion of profitability can be captured starting from the definition of the 
profit rate rt = St /Kt-1 or St = rtKt-1, where t stands for time and the other notation is as 
above. Hence, the capital stock is lagged by one time period simply because profits 
come after and not simultaneously with investment. We differentiate with respect to 
Kt-1 and so we get: 
1
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1 1 1
d d d1
d d d
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Where the term dSt / dKt-1 indicates the change in profits caused by a change in capital 
stock of the past period, which is equivalent to saying the change in profits caused by 
investment flows of the past period, It-1. The latter is derived from the usual definition 
of the capital stock, Kt = (1 – δ) Kt–1 + It, where δ is the depreciation rate and It is the 
gross investment. It follows that ΔKt = It  –  δΚt-1 = INt = net investment. Thus, dSt / dKt-1 ≈ 
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ΔSt / INt–1 = ρt, which is known as the Incremental Rate of Returns (IROR).10 The 
fraction in the parenthesis above stands for the elasticity of the profit rate with respect 
to capital stock for which the following hold, 
if 1
1
d 0 then 
d
t t
t t
t t
r K r
K r
ρ−
−
⎛ ⎞ > >⎜ ⎟ < <⎝ ⎠   
Clearly, the volatility of ρ is determined by the elasticity of the profit rate with respect 
to capital stock (the term in the parenthesis above), that is, the variability of this 
elasticity is what differentiates the IROR from the usual average rate of profit.11 In 
fact, the concept of IROR is used in the literature of corporate finance as a reliable 
index for the assessment of profitability of firms and therefore forms one of the 
“fundamentals” that investors consider in their investment decisions. The argument is 
that the rate of profit which tends to be equalized between industries is not necessarily 
the mean rate of profit of the total industry, but rather the rate of profit corresponding 
to the regulating conditions of production within an industry.  
The Figure below depicts the expected trajectories of the usual average rate of 
profit (r) of an industry and the IROR of the same industry. We observe that the 
IROR, that is, the volatility of the short-run rate of profit is expected to reflect the 
uncertainty and all the noise and short-run behaviour in the economy. Thus the IROR 
is depicted as orbiting around the economy-wide average rate of profit of the industry 
which is expected to display much less variability. 
                                                 
10 The concept is known in the literature of corporate finance and was introduced as a proxy for the 
profit rate of regulating capitals by Shaikh (1995 and 2008). 
11 It is important to note that the IROR is closely related to the internal rate of return which is used in 
the economics of industrial organization and of corporate finance for investment decisions (See also 
Tsoulfidis and Tsaliki, 2011). 
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Figure 1. Average rate of profit vs. IROR 
 
Figuratively speaking, the two rates of profit share approximately the same mean, 
although the variance of the IROR is much higher than that of the average rate of 
profit. The rationale is that the average rate of profit is the profits of all firms 
comprising the industry divided by the total capital of the industry; as a result, in the 
so estimated average are included firms with excessively high profit rates and firms 
with the lowest profit rates. As a consequence, such extreme rates of profits will most 
likely tend to cancel each other out giving rise to an average rate of profit with 
relatively low variability. By contrast, the group of firms forming the regulating 
conditions pretty much share the same type of production methods and are those 
firms, where the inflow and outflow of investment takes place and thus their average 
profitability is expected to display considerably more variability than that of the 
industry-wide average.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
If perfect competition is an idealized situation imposed by the requirements of the 
neoclassical theory, then we can say that the so called “monopolistic competition” 
revolution of the 1930s essentially led to the establishment of the unrealistic model of 
perfect competition not only for theoretical purposes but also to inform policy 
decisions. As a result, the classical conception of competition, as a process of rivalry 
between firms over market shares was set to the fringes of economic analysis. It is 
r, ρ 
time 
ρ 
r 
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only in recent years that we are witnessing the resurfacing of the notion of 
competition as a process in the works of Marxists, Schumpeterian and Austrian 
economists. It is important to stress that the classical conception of competition 
because of its realistic approach appears also in the business literature. For example, 
the work of Porter (1990) as well as the resource advantage approach (Hunt, 2000) 
have much in common with the dynamic conception of competition as a process of 
rivalry between firms. Under these circumstance, firms in their incessant struggle for 
survival introduce new technologies investing in fixed capital and in doing so increase 
their productivity and reduce their unit cost and by undercutting their prices expand 
their market share thereby leading to the gradual displacement and subsequent 
absorption, or simply elimination, of rival firms. It is obvious that this kind of 
competition is not the same with “competition” as a static situation, where firms have 
all the time they need to decide on the amount of output to be produced based on a 
given price. The same argument holds true for other forms of competition, such as the 
monopolistic or oligopolistic competition, because these models are essentially 
attempts to inject doses of realism in the static and apparently unrealistic model of 
perfect competition which always remains in the background of the neoclassical 
analysis of competition.  
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